Spouses
DARACAN, Petitioners vs. JUDGE NATIVIDAD, respondent.
A.M.
No.RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners
alleged that upon motion of the court-appointed guardian, the respondent Judge
issued the subject writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even
as they were not parties to the guardianship proceedings. Respondent judge
pleaded that he thought all along that under Section
6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, he could issue the questioned writ to
protect and preserve the rights of the wards since the petitioners were
indebted to them.
ISSUE:
May
a judge in a guardianship proceedings issue a writ of preliminary attachment
against debtors of the ward?
RULING:
NO.
Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court under which the respondent
judge issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction provides that any
person who is suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any
money, goods or interest or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his
estate may be cited by the court to appear for examination, touching such
money, goods, interest or instrument and make such orders as will secure the
estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In
the leading case of Cui vs. Piccio, it was held that the purpose of the
said rule is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property
of the ward. In such proceeding the court has no authority to determine the
right of property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the
court finds sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it
is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper action.
Thus,
the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the writ. A guardianship court exercises but a
limited jurisdiction that cannot extend to the determination of questions of
ownership.
DIWATA
RAMOS LANDINGIN, Petitioner vs.
REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R.
No. 164948 June 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner, a
citizen and a resident of Guam, USA but of Filipino parentage, filed a petition for the
adoption of three minors who are the children of her deceased brother. The
mother of said children went to Italy to work; but later on re-married and now
has two children by her second marriage. Allegedly, the mother no longer
communicated with her children nor provided them support. The trial court
granted her petition for adoption; but, the Court of Appeals revoked such grant
contending, among others, that the voluntary consent of the natural parent must
be obtained.
ISSUE:
Is the consent of the biological parent
required in a petition for adoption?
HELD:
YES.
Section 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998 provides that the written consent of the biological parent(s) of
the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child is necessary to the
adoption after being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give
or withhold his/her approval of the adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. It was even shown that the mother did not relinquished entirely her
motherly obligations of rearing the children as she was consulted for serious
personal problems and continued to send financial support to the children though
in minimal amounts.
IN
RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM and MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
G.R.
Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner,
together with her first husband, registered Michelle and Michael making it
appear as if they were their parents. Said children were entrusted to them and
their biological parents were unknown. When petitioner’s first husband died, she
remarried an American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated child
birth. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court. Both children were already of legal age
during such petition and gave their consent to the adoption. However, trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband citing Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, who
has remarried, can singly adopt
HELD:
NO. At the time the petitions were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. According to Section 7, Article III of RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in three instances
which were not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts,
they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.